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This paper analyzes how capital structure affects the firms’ strategic choice
between outsourcing with long term contracts and outsourcing to the spot
market. When outsourcing to the spot market firms are exposed to price
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1 Introduction
Outsourcing has become an important part of today’s business as many organiza-
tions rely on outsourcing to organize their production modes. In 2002 US manufac-
turers were outsourcing more than 70% of their products (Corbert (2004)) and in
the UK a survey realized in 2000 shows that 68% of organizations outsource some of
their activities (Manpower UK Ltd. (2003)). In recent years, benefiting from dereg-
ulation of emerging economies, increased competition, improvements in information
technology and rapid dissemination of the internet, many firms have started to out-
source internationally.1 There has been, however, mixed patterns in the way firms
conduct their outsourcing activities. Some firms engage in long term contractual
agreements with independent suppliers, while others rely on outsourcing directly to
the spot market, without any sort of long term commitment with suppliers.
There are some important differences between these two outsourcing regimes
that can potentially affect the firms’ profits and market value. Outsourcing to the
spot market often involves price uncertainty, whereas outsourcing to independent
suppliers, using a long term contract, allows firms to set in advance the outsourcing
price for the duration of the contract. This suggests that long term contracts are
somehow equivalent to forward contracts, and therefore can be used to rule out
price uncertainty. This paper explicitly examines a buyer’s strategic choice between
outsourcing to the spot market and outsourcing to an independent supplier, using
a long term contract, by recognizing that levered firms may use long term contracts
for risk management reasons. When exposed to high input price uncertainty, levered
firms may experience deadweight losses from financial distress in bad states of nature,
and this provides an important incentive to outsource with long term contracts.2
1For a survey on the forces driving international outsourcing see Spencer (2005).
2Of course, there are a number of other motivations for hedging, including taxes, managerial in-
centives, capital market imperfections and inefficient investment. For a review of the determinants
of hedging by corporations see Smith and Stulz (1985) and Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993).
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Financial distress has been described in the risk management literature as a
state where a levered firm incurs additional losses (deadweight costs) because its
cash flows are not sufficient to cover debt payments. The papers that have analyzed
the importance of risk management to reduce these deadweight costs of financial dis-
tress include Smith and Stulz (1985), Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), Brown
and Toft (2002), Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005) and Purnanandam (2008). This litera-
ture usually considers three main sources of financial distress costs. First, financial
distress costs arise due to the decrease in product-market competitiveness. A fi-
nancially distressed firm may lose customers, valuable suppliers and key employees
because these stakeholders may seek to reduce their long-term dependence on firms
with a high likelihood of bankruptcy. Second, a financially distressed firm is more
likely to violate its debt covenants or miss coupon/principal payments (Purnanan-
dam (2008)). These violations impose deadweight losses in the form of financial
penalties, accelerated debt-payments, operations inflexibility and managerial time
and resources spent on negotiations with the lenders. Finally, a financially distressed
firm may have to forego a positive NPV project due to costly external financing, as
in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993).
By incorporating financial distress costs in our framework, we create an obvious
link between our study and this literature. There are, however, important differ-
ences in the modeling strategy. The risk management literature focus on hedging
with derivatives, whereas we assume that long term contracts can be used as a
complement to derivatives to hedge input price risk. Spinler, Huchzermeier, and
Kleindorfer (2003) gives the example of polyethylene companies that usually have
small margins and cannot afford the high costs of some derivatives. Cohen and
Agrawal (1999) and Stulz (1996) refer to the importance of long term contracts as
a risk management instrument for risk averse decision makers, and Li and Kouvelis
(1999) provide some examples where the outsourcing of inputs involves substantial
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price uncertainty such that the use of long term outsourcing contracts is very im-
portant (paper, agriculture, electronics, textiles, commodity fibers, petro chemical).
Since financial distress costs play an important role in our model, we are specially
concerned with the factors that drive these costs, and ultimately with the effect that
these costs have in the outsourcing decision. We consider the outsourcing decision
by a monopolist and this allows us to focus on the effect of input price uncertainty
and leverage on financial distress costs, and consequently on the firm’s profits.
With a monopoly in the downstream market, we find that outsourcing to the
spot market involves a trade-off between a positive convexity effect of input price
uncertainty and a negative effect caused by financial distress costs. The first effect
captures the idea that with no deadweight losses associated with bad states of nature,
the firm’s profits are increasing in input price uncertainty. Given that the buyer can
fully adjust capacity for a given input price, he only cares with the upside potential,
and therefore takes advantage from price uncertainty.3 The second effect shows how
input price uncertainty can induce deadweight losses when the firm’s profit flow in
the bad states of nature is not enough to pay out debt. We derive the conditions
for which the financial distress costs of the spot regime are positive, and show that
they increase as the wedge between debt and the profit flow increases. Therefore,
negative demand shocks or an increase in the firm’s cost structure causes an increase
in financial distress costs as it depresses profits.
Our model predicts that the monopolist always outsources to the spot market
if financial distress costs are zero in order to fully benefit from the positive convex-
ity effect of input price uncertainty. Rather, if financial distress costs are positive,
the equilibrium depends on how severely are the firm’s profits affected by financial
3This positive convexity effect derives from Jensen’s inequality. Since the expected profit is a
convex function of input price uncertainty, it follows that the expected value of a convex function
of a random variable is greater than the value of the function evaluated at the expected value of
the random variable.
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distress costs. We derive a measure that captures the sensitivity of these profits to
financial distress costs, and show that the long term contract regime holds when
there are high financial distress costs associated with the spot regime. By out-
sourcing with a long term contract the monopolist can perfectly hedge input price
uncertainty.
We formalize a bilateral bargaining game between the monopolist and the sup-
plier when the long term contract is in place. The game allows us to endogenize the
proportion of the profit derived by each part, and consequently to endogenize the
outsourcing price. This represents a contribution to the outsourcing literature, in
particular to the one that studies the decision to vertically integrate or outsource.4
Before we proceed, we further contrast our analysis with related work in the
literature. While we motivate the use of long term contracts as a risk management
device, alternative explanations have been examined in the economics and operations
management literature. The economics literature builds on the incomplete contract-
ing view of Williamson (1975). This theory argues that, in a context of incomplete
contracting, long term contracts provide greater benefits when the products to be
outsourced are more specific (specialized or differentiated) and spot transactions are
more frequent for standard products. When products are more specific, there is a
higher requirement for the parties to make a specific investment but, at the same
time, the specific investment can create hold-up problems. With a long term con-
tract the parties can mitigate the hold-up problem because they can benefit from a
future relationship.
On the other hand, the operations management literature has focused more on
the choice between option contracts and the spot market (see Kleindorfer, Wu, and
4Grossman and Helpman (2002), Levy (2006) and Fontenay and Gans (2008) develop an out-
sourcing model that incorporates a bilateral game between a buyer and a set of suppliers but where
the proportion of the surplus collected by each part is exogenous.
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Zhang (2002), Spinler, Huchzermeier, and Kleindorfer (2003) and Kleindorfer and
Wu (2005)). Option contracts are common in capital intensive industries where ca-
pacity can only be expanded well in advance of output requirements. With these
contracts the buyer acquires the option to buy capacity from the supplier. A reser-
vation fee is paid ex-ante and an execution fee is paid if the option is exercised. The
choice between the execution of these options and the acquisition of the input from
the spot market depends on the balance between the costs involved with the option
contract and the level of realized demand in the downstream market.
Although we focus on input price uncertainty and assume risk neutrality, our
study also relates to the literature on the behavior of the firm under price uncer-
tainty. Prominent contributions by Carlton (1979), Polinsky (1987) and Hubbard
and Weiner (1992) examine the buyers’ choice between spot sales and sales with a
long term contract assuming risk aversion and demand uncertainty.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set out the
basic model and the assumptions for the monopoly structure. Section 3 concludes
and summarizes some empirical predictions of our theory. Proofs of all propositions
are detailed in the Appendix.
2 Monopoly in the downstream market
In this section we examine the choice between outsourcing to the spot market and
outsourcing to an independent supplier, using a long term contract, when there
is a monopoly in the downstream market. We start off with the derivation of the
equilibrium prices and profits under each outsourcing regime, and then proceed with
the analysis of the monopolist’s equilibrium decision.
Consider a monopolist that produces a homogeneous product A and sells this
6
product in market A. One unit of product A requires one unit of input B. The
monopolist can outsource input B either to the spot market B or to an independent
supplier. For simplification purposes, we assume that the monopolist only operates
in market A, and therefore the quantity that he outsources of input B must equal
the quantity that he sells of product A.
There are two dates. At time t = 0 the monopolist decides which outsourcing
regime he will use to acquire input B. If he outsources to the spot market, he faces
input price uncertainty as he does not know what price of input B will prevail at
the end of the period. At time t = 1 uncertainty is resolved and the monopolist
decides which quantity to outsource (and to sell in market A) given the observed
input prices. Alternatively, if the monopolist outsources input B to the independent
supplier, at time t = 0 he writes a long term contract (one-period contract) with the
supplier which allows him to set in advance the outsourcing price, and consequently
the cost of production for the entire period. Contrary to outsourcing to the spot
market, outsourcing with a long term contract rules out all input price uncertainty.
Furthermore, in order to examine the effect of the monopolist’s capital structure
on the outsourcing decision, we assume that he has debt outstanding in the amount
D, which is due to be paid at time t = 1. We assume that the monopolist is, in some
degree, financially constrained, and also needs debt to take advantage of investment
opportunities. For simplification purposes, we assume that the independent supplier
has no leverage and does not compete in the market B. The supplier produces with
unlimited capacity and only incurs the marginal cost cB.
We model the input price uncertainty of the spot regime as follows. At time
t = 1 there are two states of nature, each with a probability of 1/2. Input prices of
B can either be high or low. We denote the bad state (high input price) and good
state (low input price) by u and d, respectively. These prices are a function of the
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expected spot price m and input price uncertainty, as measured by s, with s > 0,
and they are defined as:
puB = m+ s (1)
pdB = m− s (2)
In the downstream market, the demand for product A can be defined as:
QA = αA − βA pA (3)
In what follows, we denote the regime where the monopolist outsources to the
spot market by S and the regime where he outsources to the independent supplier,
with a long term contract, by LT . To simplify the exposition, we assume risk
neutrality and a zero interest rate.
Next, we derive the equilibrium profits under each regime and discuss the ad-
vantages and disadvantages provided by each one. Consider first the case where the
monopolist is outsourcing to the spot market. At time t = 0 the expected profit of
the monopolist, E (ΠAS), is given by:
E (ΠAS) =
1
2
ΠuAS +
1
2
ΠdAS (4)
where ΠuAS (ΠdAS) is the realized profit when the spot price of input B is puB (pdB).
Furthermore, we assume that the monopolist has a marginal cost cA and a fixed cost
fA.If we denote the inverse demand function by piAS (QiAS), with i ∈ {u, d} (when
the input price is puB and pdB, respectively), and consider linear cost functions, it
follows that the realized profit of the monopolist in state i is:
ΠiAS = Π
i
AS NFDC − FDCiS (5)
where FDCiS are the financial distress costs that the monopolist may incur when
outsourcing to the spot market and ΠiAS NFDC is the realized profit when these
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financial distress costs are zero. ΠiAS NFDC is defined as:
ΠiAS NFDC = Q
i
AS
(
piAS
(
QiAS
)− cA − piB)− fA (6)
Financial distress costs are associated with bad states of nature (see Brown and
Toft (2002), Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005), and Purnanandam (2008)). Our formal
definition of these costs is closely related to the one proposed by Fehle and Tsyplakov
(2005). The idea is that when the monopolist is outsourcing with a high input price
(in our model when puB is realized), the firm’s instantaneous profit flow (revenues
less operating costs) may not be sufficient to pay debt. If this happens, the firm is
in financial distress and incurs additional losses. These additional cash flow losses
arise because customers, suppliers, or strategic partners may not be willing to deal
with financially distressed firms. Hence, the magnitude of financial distress costs
is determined by how low the firm’s revenue falls relative to the debt payment and
production costs. These costs are important because they may be incurred long
before bankruptcy, and they provide an incentive to manage risk. Formally, we
define the financial distress costs of the spot regime as:
FDCiS = kmax
[
0, D − ΠiAS NFDC
]
(7)
where the parameter k > 0 is a constant that captures the intensity of financial
distress cost and ΠiAS NFDC is as stated in (6). An increase in k intensifies the value
loss caused by financial distress costs.5 Since financial distress costs are associated
with bad states of nature, we assume in this section that they can only occur when
the input price is high (puB), i.e. we assume that FDCuS ≥ 0 and FDCdS = 0.6
We are now in a position to derive the equilibrium expressions for the spot regime.
The monopolist optimizes his profit flow with respect to QiAS, given the realized
5The parameter k has an upper bound (see expression in the Appendix) to ensure that the
monopolist’s equity value remains positive. Formally we require that the expression for the firm’s
profit, net of financial distress costs, as given by (5) is positive.
6The expression for the set of parameters for which FDCuS ≥ 0 is presented in proposition 1.
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price piB at which input B is supplied. Substituting the equilibrium quantities
and prices into the profit functions gives us the expressions for ΠuAS and ΠdAS. We
further present the equilibrium expression of financial distress costs and the set of
parameters for which these are positive. Proposition 1 summarizes these results. To
simplify our exposition of the equilibrium, we denote by E (ΠAS)NFDC the expected
profit of the monopolist when financial distress costs are zero, i.e. E (ΠAS)NFDC
= E (ΠAS) if FDCuS = 0.
Proposition 1 If market A is a monopoly where a firm faces the demand function
(3) for product A and outsources input B to the spot market, then the equilibrium
expected profit of this firm at time t = 0 is:
E (ΠAS) = E (ΠAS)NFDC −
1
2
FDCuS (8)
where
E (ΠAS)NFDC =
[αA − βA (cA +m)]2
4βA
− fA + s
2βA
4
(9)
FDCuS = kmax
[
0, D −
(
[αA − βA (cA +m+ s)]2
4βA
− fA
)]
(10)
Given that k > 0, the monopolist incurs positive financial distress costs if:
s >
αA − βA (cA +m)− 2
√
βA (D + fA)
βA
≡ ŝ (11)
and zero financial distress costs if otherwise. The realized profits in the bad and good
state are, respectively:
ΠuAS =
[αA − βA (cA +m+ s)]2
4βA
− fA − FDCuS (12)
ΠdAS =
[αA − βA (cA +m− s)]2
4βA
− fA (13)
The equilibrium output prices for product A in the bad and good state are, respec-
tively:
puAS =
αA + βA (cA +m+ s)
2βA
(14)
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pdAS =
αA + βA (cA +m− s)
2βA
(15)
Proposition 1 states that expected profit of the monopolist when outsourcing
to the spot market (expression (8)) consists of the expected profit when financial
distress costs are zero minus the value of financial distress costs that can arise from
outsourcing at a high input price puB (this latter component is multiplied by the
probability of reaching the bad state). Hence, it is obvious from this expression the
negative effect of financial distress costs on the monopolist’s expected profit. Let us
now discuss in detail what influences the value of each of these components of the
expected profit, particularly the effect of input price uncertainty, leverage, demand
shocks and the monopolist’s cost structure.
First, consider the case where financial distress costs are zero. The expected
profit is given by (9), which we decompose in two components. The first, [αA−βA(cA+m)]
2
4βA
−
fA, only incorporates demand and cost parameters, whereas the second, s
2βA
4
, pro-
vides the additional effect of input price uncertainty. The first component of the
expected profit shows how positive demand shocks, like an increase in the size of mar-
ket A (measured by αA) or a reduction in the buyer’s variable and fixed production
costs (cA and fA, respectively) affects positively the firm’s profit flow. Furthermore,
the monopolist benefits from a decrease in the expected spot price from outsourcing
(as measured by m). The second component of the expected profit represents the
important positive convexity effect of uncertainty (as measured by s) on profits. If
financial distress costs are zero (s ≤ ŝ, with ŝ defined in (11)), there is no cost as-
sociated with the bad state of nature since the monopolist can fully adjust capacity
and care exclusively with the upside potential (outsourcing at a lower input price).
In this case, higher input price uncertainty always increases the advantage of the
spot regime.7
7As noted earlier, this positive convexity effect derives from Jensen’s inequality.
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Input price uncertainty can also have, however, a negative effect on the monop-
olist’s expected profit when there are financial distress costs caused by the firm’s
leverage. Before we discuss the overall effect of input price uncertainty on this
expected profit, let us analyze what exactly determines the magnitude of these fi-
nancial distress costs. From (10), one can see that these costs depend positively on
the parameter k associated with the intensity of financial distress costs and also on
the positive wedge between debt (D) and the profit flow realized in the bad state of
nature ( [αA−βA(cA+m+s)]
2
4βA
−fA). All else equal, an increase in the uncertainty measure
s in the bad state of nature induces a higher input price puB, and as a consequence
an increase in financial distress costs.8
Therefore, there are two opposite effects of an increase in input price uncertainty
on the monopolist’s expected profit from outsourcing to the spot market: the positive
convexity effect versus the negative effect caused by financial distress costs. We show
that the intensity of financial distress costs, as measured by k, plays an important
role in the overall effect of uncertainty as:
∂E (ΠAS)
∂s
> (<)0 if k < (>)
2βAs
αA − βA (cA +m+ s) ≡ k
∗ (16)
The intuition behind condition (16) is that if the intensity of financial distress
costs is low (k < k∗), the positive convexity effect dominates and an increase in
s increases the monopolist’s expected profit. Hence, even with positive financial
distress costs the monopolist may benefit from increased uncertainty in the spot
market. Conversely, if the intensity of financial distress costs is high (k > k∗), the
financial distress cost effect dominates and the monopolist has an incentive to avoid
outsourcing to the spot market.
Next, we consider the case where the monopolist outsources the production of
8When the condition for positive financial distress costs (11) is satisfied, we show that financial
distress costs depend positively on s as ∂FDC
u
S
∂s = k
αA−βA(cA+m+s)
2 > 0.
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input B to the independent supplier, using a long term contract. We assume that
the negotiation process in the long term contract is formalized as Nash bargaining,
where the bargaining power is split between the monopolist and the supplier.9 The
distribution of the bargaining power is given exogenously and is described by the
parameter η ∈ [0, 1], where η is defined as the monopolist’s bargaining power. As
a result of bargaining, each side receives a fraction of the total profit under global
maximization.10 We start off with the determination of the total profit under global
maximization, and subsequently derive the optimal sharing rule and the firms’ prof-
its.
If we denote the inverse demand function by pALT (QALT ), it follows that the
total profit under global maximization, ΠGM , is:
ΠGM = QALT (pALT (QALT )− cA − cB)− fA (17)
Let w be the outcome of the Nash bargaining process such that the monopolist
receives a fraction w of the total profit under global maximization and the supplier
receives 1 − w, with w ∈ [0, 1]. The proportion of the total profit received by each
side depends on the value of the firms’ outside options. These are the profits the
parties would make in case they decide to quit the negotiation. We assume that the
monopolist’s outside option consists of outsourcing to the spot market, and therefore
its value is given by the profit expression E (ΠAS), previously stated in proposition
1 (equation (8)). For simplification purposes, we assume that the supplier has no
outside option. Therefore, the fraction received by the monopolist must be the
9The game in is modeled as in Fan and Sundaresan (2000). In order to focus on the role of
financial distress on the outsourcing decision, we ignore repeated interactions between the buyer
and the supplier (see Dawid and Kopel (2003) and Hadlock and Lewis (2003) for a dynamic model
of bargaining in subcontracting).
10This is the maximum profit the parties can make together if negotiation is possible, where they
act jointly as a global optimizer.
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solution to the Nash bargaining game (maximization with respect to w):
max
w
[w ΠGM − E (ΠAS)]η [(1− w) ΠGM − 0]1−η (18)
It follows that the optimal sharing rule is:11
w =
η [ΠGM − E (ΠAS)] + E (ΠAS)
ΠGM
(19)
These results show that if the monopolist’s outside option is zero (E (ΠAS) = 0),
he receives a fraction of the total profit under global maximization equal to his
exogenous bargaining power (w = η). Alternatively, if the expected profit from
outsourcing to the spot market equals the total profit that is possible to generate
with the long term contract (E (ΠAS) = ΠGM), he is able to collect the full surplus
of the long term contract as w = 1. Expression (19) also shows another important
result concerning the effect of input price uncertainty on the proportion of the profits
collected by each firm, and as a consequence on the profits they realize with the long
term contract. Given that the magnitude of input price uncertainty (as measured
by s) has effect on the monopolist’s expected profit from outsourcing to the spot
market (E (ΠAS)), the proportion that he derives with the long term contract is
naturally affected by this uncertainty.
Next, denote the buyer’s and the supplier’s profit with the long term contract
by ΠALT and ΠBLT , respectively. Given the assumption above, these profits sum up
to the profit under global maximization, ΠGM = ΠALT + ΠBLT , and can be defined
as ΠALT = wΠGM and ΠBLT = (1− w) ΠGM . Also, if we denote the agreed input
price of the long term contract by pBLT , and assume as before that QALT = QBLT ,
it follows that these profits are given by:
ΠALT = wΠGM = QALT (pALT (QALT )− cA − pBLT )− fA (20)
11The optimization problem is solved only for the relevant case where the monopolist’s outside
option is lower than the total profit under global maximization, i.e. E (ΠAS) ≤ ΠGM .
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ΠBLT = (1− w) ΠGM = QALT (pBLT − cB) (21)
With these results, we can easily determine the equilibrium outsourcing price
agreed for input B under the long term contract. It is obtained by solving any of
these profit functions for pBLT (equation (20) or (21)), after substituting the propor-
tion w by the expression previously derived in (19). It follows that the outsourcing
input price is given by:
pBLT =
(1− η) [ΠGM − E (ΠAS)]
QALT
+ cB (22)
As expected, in both scenarios where the monopolist is able to collect the whole
surplus from the long term contract (as discussed earlier, when the profit under
global maximization equals the outside option (ΠGM = E (ΠAS)) or when η = 1),
the outsourcing price converges to the marginal cost of the supplier, and the supplier
makes a zero profit.
We are now in a position to determine the equilibrium quantities, prices and
profits under the long term contract regime. The equilibrium quantities QALT are
derived by optimizing the total profit under global maximization defined in equation
(17). By substituting this quantity into the demand function (3), we obtain the
equilibrium prices in market A pALT . Finally, by substituting these quantities and
prices into the profit functions (20) and (21), we determine the expressions for the
equilibrium profits of the monopolist and the supplier, respectively. These results
are summarized in proposition 2.
Proposition 2 If market A is a monopoly where a firm faces the demand function
(3) for product A and outsources input B to an independent supplier, using a long
term contract, then the equilibrium profit under global maximization that is possible
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to generate with the contract is:
ΠGM =
[αA − βA (cA + cB)]2
4βA
− fA (23)
The equilibrium profits of the monopolist and the supplier are, respectively:
ΠALT = E (ΠAS) + η [ΠGM − E (ΠAS)] (24)
ΠBLT = (1− η) [ΠGM − E (ΠAS)] (25)
where ΠGM is given by (23) and E (ΠAS) is the value of the monopolist’s outside
option as given by (8). The equilibrium output price for product A is:
pALT =
αA + βA (cA + cB)
2βA
(26)
Proposition 2 shows that input price uncertainty, as measured by s, has no effect
on the downstream price of product A, and consequently on the profit under global
maximization. As to be expected, the long term contract allows the monopolist to
perfectly hedge input price uncertainty by setting in advance the outsourcing price.
If there are relevant reasons for hedging input price uncertainty, then long term
contracts can represent an important tool for risk management. We discuss next,
under which circumstances the use of long term contracts can create value for the
firm.
2.1 Monopolist’s choice of the outsourcing regime
We now examine the monopolist’s choice of the outsourcing regime at time t = 0.
The monopolist compares the expected profit from outsourcing to the spot market
with the profit under global maximization from outsourcing with the long term
contract and chooses the regime with the highest expected profit. Let us denote the
extra profit or surplus from outsourcing to the spot market by:
Surplus ≡ E (ΠAS)− ΠGM (27)
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In order to focus our discussion of the equilibrium on the effect of input price
uncertainty and financial distress costs, we ignore any cost differences between the
two regimes, i.e. we assume that the expected input price from the spot market is
the same as the supplier’s marginal cost (m = cB). Under this assumption, one can
show that the surplus from the spot market regime is given by:
Surplus =
s2βA
4
− kmax
[
0, D −
(
[αA − βA (cA +m+ s)]2
4βA
− fA
)]
(28)
This expression states that the advantage of the spot market regime relies on the
trade-off between a positive convexity effect of uncertainty (first term of (28)) and a
negative effect caused by financial distress costs (second term of (28)). This result
has several interesting implications, which we state in the following two propositions.
Proposition 3 summarizes the equilibrium if financial distress costs are zero, whereas
proposition 4 considers positive financial distress costs.
Proposition 3 Assume that the expected spot price is the same as the supplier’s
marginal cost (m = cB) and consider the input price uncertainty level ŝ as stated
previously in (11). If 0 < s ≤ ŝ such that financial distress costs are zero, the
monopolist always outsources to the spot market.
This proposition shows that if the level of input price uncertainty is not enough to
cause any financial distress costs, the monopolist has no deadweight losses associated
with the spot regime, and thus chooses this regime in order to benefit from the
positive convexity effect of uncertainty. He derives a surplus from outsourcing given
by s
2βA
4
.
Now, let us assume that the level of uncertainty is such that financial distress
costs from outsourcing to the spot regime are positive, i.e. s > ŝ, with ŝ once again
as given by the righ hand side of (11). In that case, one can show that the surplus
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expression (28) can be rearranged and expressed as:
Surplus (FDC > 0) =
s2βA
4
− 1
2
k(D + fA) +
1
2
k
[αA − βA (cA +m+ s)]2
4βA
(29)
The surplus from outsourcing is a quadratic function of s, which means that if we
solve this function for s, there are two levels of the uncertainty measure where the
monopolist is indifferent between one regime and the other. We denote this levels
by s∗j , with j ∈ {1, 2} and s∗1 < s∗2.12 One can show that s∗j is:
s∗1,2 =
k [αA − βA (cA +m)]±
√
2βA
√
2 (D + fA) βA (2 + k) k − k [αA − βA (cA +m)]2
βA (2 + k)
(30)
These levels of the uncertainty measure play an important role in the derivation of
the outsourcing equilibrium, as we summarize in proposition 4 below.
Proposition 4 Assume that the expected spot price is the same as the supplier’s
marginal cost (m = cB) and consider the two levels of the input price uncertainty
measure s∗1 and s∗2 given by (30), for which the monopolist is indifferent between out-
sourcing to the spot market and outsourcing with a long term contract. Furthermore,
consider the input price uncertainty level ŝ as stated previously in (11).
If s > ŝ such that financial distress costs are positive, the outsourcing choice repre-
sents a trade-off between the positive convexity effect associated with uncertainty and
the level of financial distress costs. It consists of one of the following three cases:
A) If ŝ < s < s∗1 the monopolist outsources to the spot market as the positive
convexity effect dominates.
B) If s∗1 < s < s∗2 the monopolist outsources with a long term contract as the negative
effect of financial distress costs associated with the spot regime dominates.
12Note, however, that there is an upper bound for s∗j as it has to ensure positive input prices
(0 < s∗j < m) and positive quantities in the bad state of nature (0 < s∗j <
αA−βA(cA+m)
βA
). See
proof of proposition 4 for this derivation.
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C) If s > s∗2 the monopolist outsources to the spot market as the positive convexity
effect associated with uncertainty dominates.
In case A, the monopolists outsources to the spot market because although
financial distress costs have been triggered, they are not high enough to offset the
positive convexity effect of input price uncertainty. Case B is the opposite case
where the monopolist is outsourcing to the independent supplier in order to avoid
the deadweight losses associated with financial distress costs. Finally, we are likely to
end up in case C when there is a combination of high uncertainty and low intensity of
financial distress costs (low k), such that the positive convexity effect of uncertainty
dominates.
Figure 2.1 illustrates an example of the monopolist’s optimal choice of the out-
sourcing regime. It depicts the expected profit of the monopolist when outsourcing
to the independent supplier and to the spot market, ΠALT and E (ΠAS) respectively,
and the total profit under global maximization with the long term contract, ΠGM ,
as a function of our measure of input price uncertainty s.13 It shows that for low
values of the input price uncertainty measure (s ≤ 1.72), the expected profit of the
monopolist under the spot regime E (ΠAS) is increasing because financial distress
costs have not been triggered. Once these costs are positive, the expected profit
from the spot regime starts decreasing. There is a small range for which this profit
is decreasing but is still higher than the profit of the long term contract. This
means that although financial distress costs are positive, there are not high enough
to offset the positive effect of input price uncertainty, and therefore the monopolist
outsources to the spot market. Then, as the input price uncertainty measure in-
13The set of input parameters used is as follows: monopolist’s bargaining power η = 0.5, expected
spot price m = 20, marginal cost of the supplier cB = 20, size of market A αA = 70, slope of
demand function βA = 1, marginal cost of monopolist cA = 20, fixed cost of monopolist fA = 0,
debt D = 200 and intensity of financial distress costs parameter k = 0.8. In the example it follows
that only s∗1 exists.
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creases, the expected profit of the spot regime is more severely affected by financial
distress costs such that it is below the profit of the long term contract. When this
occurs the long term contract regime dominates.
(Insert Figure 2.1 here)
Up to this point, we have mainly discussed the effect of uncertainty on financial
distress costs, and consequently on the choice of the outsourcing regime. We should
note, however, that what drives these costs is the existence of debt on the firm’s
capital structure. Next, we determine the debt level D∗ that makes the monopolist
indifferent between the two regimes. This is obtained by solving equation E (ΠAS)−
ΠGM = 0 for D. It follows that:
D∗ =
1
2
s2βA
k
+
[αA − βA (cA +m+ s)]2
4βA
− fA (31)
This indifference level can be interpreted as the maximum debt the monopolist can
afford if outsourcing to the spot market. For any debt level above D∗ the surplus
from the spot regime is negative, and therefore the monopolist chooses to outsource
to the independent supplier in order to avoid financial distress costs. A change in the
parameters that increase the profit flow, as an increase in the size of market A (αA)
or a decrease in the operational costs (cA, m and fA), increases this indifference level,
which means that the monopolist can afford to use more debt when outsourcing to
the spot market.
Furthermore, from expression (31) one can see that the effect of the uncertainty
measure s on D∗ depends on the parameter k associated with the intensity of finan-
cial distress costs. We show that ∂D∗
∂s
> (<) 0 if k < (>) k∗ where k∗ is as previously
defined in (16). This suggests that if we combine high intensity of financial distress
costs and high input price uncertainty, firms tend to reduce their debt level in order
to stay in the spot regime or, alternatively, they prefer to outsource with long term
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contracts. This prediction captures Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) idea that
when long term contracts are used as a risk management device they can be seen as
a mean of increasing debt capacity.
3 Conclusions
This paper develops a model that examines a firm’s choice between outsourcing to
an independent supplier, using a long term contract, and outsourcing to the spot
market. It incorporates one important dimension of the problem: capital structure.
The main difference between the two outsourcing regimes relies on the uncertainty
associated with the outsourcing price. Outsourcing to the spot market involves input
price uncertainty, whereas outsourcing with a long term contract allows the buyer
to set in advance this price and rule out uncertainty. We investigate the outsourcing
decision by a monopolist, where we focus on the effect of leverage and uncertainty
on financial distress costs. The main conclusions and empirical implications of the
paper are discussed below.
We find that outsourcing to the spot market involves a trade-off between a pos-
itive convexity effect of input price uncertainty and a negative effect derived from
financial distress costs. If the level of debt and input price uncertainty is not suf-
ficient to induce positive financial distress costs in the bad state of nature, the
monopolist chooses to outsource to the spot market in order to take advantage of
the positive effect of uncertainty on profits. The monopolist’s profits increase with
input price uncertainty because he can fully adjust capacity for a given input price,
and therefore focuses on the upside potential of the spot regime.
However, to the extent that leverage and input price uncertainty can induce
financial distress costs in bad states of nature, there is an incentive for the monopolist
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to outsource with a long term contract. A long term contract provides a perfect
hedge of input price uncertainty, and consequently creates value by eliminating
these costs. We find that the equilibrium depends on how severely the firm’s profits
are depressed by financial distress costs, and derive a measure that captures the
sensitivity of the firm’s profits to these costs. Our model predicts that these costs
are positively related with leverage, input price uncertainty, negative demand shocks
and the buyer’s marginal and fixed costs. This result is in line with Opler and
Titman (1994) as they show that during industry downturns more highly levered
firms experience higher drops in equity values than less levered firms. We model the
long term contract regime as a Nash bargaining game between the monopolist and
the supplier, which allows to endogenize the outsourcing price and the proportion
of the surplus each firm derives.
Our theory provides new predictions that can be empirically testable. In the
monopoly section we derive the level of debt that makes the monopolist indifferent
between outsourcing to the spot market and outsourcing to the independent supplier.
We show that in the presence of financial distress costs, firms that outsource to the
spot market have limited debt capacity as they need to avoid these costs. Thus, our
model predicts that firms outsourcing with long term contracts have greater debt
capacity and that firms outsourcing to the spot market may be underlevered.
Further research could be aimed at testing empirically some of our predictions.
There are also some ways of extending the study theoretically. First, incorporate
the possibility of partial outsourcing where the buyers could outsource a proportion
of the input to the spot market and another proportion to the independent supplier.
Second, allow for an outside option of the supplier and consider some capacity
constraints in production such that this production is not enough to satisfy all
buyers.
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4 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
In order to determine the equilibrium profits in each state, we first derive the
equilibrium quantities and prices in market A. The monopolist optimizes the profit
flow (5) with respect to QiAS, and this for a given price piB at which input B is
supplied. We further assume that financial distress costs are zero in the good state,
i.e. FDCdS = 0. It follows that the equilibrium quantities in state u and d are,
respectively:
QuAS =
αA − βA (cA +m+ s)
2
(32)
QdAS =
αA − βA (cA +m− s)
2
(33)
Substituting these quantities into the corresponding demand functions gives us the
expressions for the equilibrium prices (14) and (15) as stated in the proposition. The
expressions for the equilibrium profits in each state (12) and (13) are then obtained
by substituting these equilibrium quantities and prices into the profit expression (5).
The expression for the monopolist’s equilibrium expected profit is derived as
follows. First, we denote the component of the equilibrium profit ΠuAS that is not
affected by financial distress costs by ΠuAS NFDC , i.e. we define ΠuAS NFDC as:
ΠuAS NFDC =
[αA − βA (cA +m+ s)]2
4βA
− fA (34)
It follows from (12) that ΠuAS can be expressed as ΠuAS = ΠuAS NFDC−FDCuS . Second,
we show that the expression of the monopolist’s expected profit E (ΠAS) = 12 Π
u
AS+
1
2
ΠdAS simplifies to E (ΠAS) =
1
2
[ΠuAS NFDC − FDCuS ] + 12 ΠdAS. Third, denoting by
E (ΠAS)NFDC the component of the monopolist’s expected profit that do not depends
on financial distress costs, it follows immediately that the equilibrium expected profit
is given by:
E (ΠAS) = E (ΠAS)NFDC −
1
2
FDCuS (35)
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where
E (ΠAS)NFDC =
1
2
ΠuAS NFDC +
1
2
ΠdAS (36)
After expanding the expressions for ΠuAS NFDC and ΠdAS and rearranging some terms
we obtain the equilibrium expression E (ΠAS)NFDC as given by (9).
Inequality (11) is derived by solving the RHS of the financial distress costs ex-
pression (10) for the input price uncertainty measure s, such that FDCuS > 0.
Finally, to ensure that the monopolist’s equity value remains positive, we derive
an upper bound for k. Formally, we require that the expression for the firm’s profit,
net of financial distress costs, as given by (5), is positive. Solving ΠiAS ≥ 0 for k
gives:
k ≤ 2 [αA − βA (cA +m+ s)]
2 − fA
4βA (D + fA)− [αA − βA (cA +m+ s)]2
(37)
Derivation of Inequality (16)
We start with equation (8) that defines E (ΠAS). It follows that:
∂E (ΠAS)
∂s
=
∂E (ΠAS)NFDC
∂s
− 1
2
∂FDCuS
∂s
(38)
where
∂E (ΠAS)NFDC
∂s
=
1
2
sβA > 0 (39)
∂FDCuS
∂s
= k
αA − βA (cA +m+ s)
2
> 0 (40)
Thus, the total derivative is positive if the following inequality holds:
1
2
sβA − 12kαA−βA(cA+m+s)2 > 0 and negative, if otherwise. Solving this inequality
for k, gives us the condition:
∂E(ΠAS)
∂s
> (<) 0 if k < (>) 2βAs
αA−βA(cA+m+s) ≡ k∗.
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Proof of proposition 2
The global optimizer maximizes the profit under global maximization (17) with
respect to the optimal quantity QALT . This quantity is also the one that will prevail
with the long term contract. It follows that the equilibrium quantity is:
QALT =
αA − βA (cA + cB)
2
(41)
Substituting this quantity into the demand function we obtain the equilibrium price
in market A as given by (26). Finally, by substituting this quantity and price into
the profit function of the global optimizer we obtain the equilibrium profit as stated
in the proposition.
The expressions for the equilibrium profit of the buyer and the supplier are
derived by substituting the expression of the proportion of the surplus captured by
the buyer w, given by (19), into the profits expressions (20) and (21), respectively.
Proof of proposition 3
The monopolist chooses to outsource to the spot market if the surplus from
outsourcing under this regime, as given by (28), is positive, and to the independent
supplier if otherwise. Further, we know from proposition 1 that if 0 < s ≤ ŝ,
where ŝ ≡ αA−βA(cA+m)−2
√
βA(D+fA)
βA
, the financial distress costs from outsourcing to
the spot market are zero. Therefore, for this set of parameters, the surplus from
outsourcing to the spot market is always positive ( s
2βA
4
> 0) and this regime always
dominates.
Proof of proposition 4
Given the two zeros s∗1 and s∗2 (expression (30)), we know that the surplus from
the spot market regime is negative for s∗1 < s < s∗2 and positive if otherwise. Hence,
the long term contract regime holds if s∗1 < s < s∗2 and the spot market regime if
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otherwise.
The upper bound on s∗j is necessary to ensure two conditions. First, positive
input prices in the good state pdB > 0, or equivalently m − s∗j > 0, which gives
s∗j < m. Second, positive quantities in the bad state QuAS =
αA−βA(cA+m+s∗j)
2
> 0, or
equivalently s∗j <
αA−βA(cA+m)
βA
.
26
References
Brown, G. W., and K. B. Toft (2002): “How Firms Should Hedge,” Review of
Financial Studies, 15, 1283–1324.
Carlton, D. W. (1979): “Contracts, Price Rigidity, and Market Equilibrium,”
Journal of Political Economy, 87, 1034–1062.
Cohen, M. A., and N. Agrawal (1999): “An Analytical Comparison of Long and
Short Term Contracts,” IIE Transactions, 31, 783–796.
Corbert, M. F. (2004): The Outsourcing Revolution. Dearbon Trade Publishing.
Dawid, H., and M. Kopel (2003): “A Comparison of Exit and Voice Relationships
under Common Uncertainty,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,
12, 531–555.
Fan, H., and S. M. Sundaresan (2000): “Debt Valuation, Renegotiation and
Optimal Dividend Policy,” Review of Financial Studies, 13, 1057–1099.
Fehle, F., and S. Tsyplakov (2005): “Dynamic Risk Management: Theory and
Evidence,” Journal of Financial Economics, 78, 3–47.
Fontenay, C., and J. S. Gans (2008): “A Bargaining Perpective on Strategic
Outsourcing and Supply Competition,” Strategic Management Journal, 29, 819–
839.
Froot, K. A., D. S. Scharfstein, and J. C. Stein (1993): “Risk Management:
Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies,” Journal of Finance,
48, 1629–1658.
Grossman, G. M., and E. Helpman (2002): “Integration vs. Outsourcing in
Industry Equilibrium,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 85–120.
27
Hadlock, C. J., and T. Lewis (2003): “Bargaining When Exchange Affects the
Value of Future Trade,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 12,
557–589.
Hubbard, R. G., and J. R. Weiner (1992): “Long-Term Contracting and
Multiple-Price Systems,” Journal of Business, 65, 177–198.
Kleindorfer, P. R., and D. J. Wu (2005): “Competitive Options, Supply Con-
tracting and Electronic Markets,” Management Science, 51, 452–466.
Kleindorfer, P. R., D. J. Wu, and J. E. Zhang (2002): “Optimal Bidding
and Contracting Strategies for Capital-Intensive Goods,” European Journal of
Operations Research, 137, 657–676.
Levy, N. (2006): “The Organization of Supply: a Vertical Equilibrium Analysis,”
University of Albany Working Paper.
Li, C., and P. Kouvelis (1999): “Flexible and Risk-Sharing Supply Contracts
Under Price Uncertainty,” Management Science, 45, 1378–1398.
Manpower UK Ltd. (2003): “Outsourcing Survey,” Technical report.
Opler, T., and S. Titman (1994): “Financial Distress and Corporate Perfor-
mance,” Journal of Finance, 49, 1015–1040.
Polinsky, A. M. (1987): “Fixed Price versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study of
Risk Allocation,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 3, 27–46.
Purnanandam, A. K. (2008): “Financial Distress and Corporate Risk Manage-
ment,” Journal of Financial Economics, 87, 706–739.
Smith, C. W., and R. M. Stulz (1985): “The Determinants of Firms’ Hedging
Policies,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 20, 391–405.
28
Spencer, B. J. (2005): “International Outsourcing and Incomplete Contracts,”
Canadian Journal of Economics, 38, 1107–1135.
Spinler, S., A. Huchzermeier, and P. Kleindorfer (2003): “Risk Hedging
via Options Contracts for Physical Delivery,” OR Spectrum, 25, 379–395.
Stulz, R. M. (1996): “Rethinking Risk Management,” Journal of Applied Corporate
Finance, 9, 8–24.
Williamson, O. E. (1975): Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Im-
plications. Free Press, New York.
29
Figure 2.1: Monopolist’s Optimal Decision
Expected profit of the monopolist under the spot regime, E (ΠAS), profit of the monopolist under the long term
contract regime, ΠALT , and total profit under global maximization, ΠGM , as a function of the input price uncertainty
measure s. The expected profit under the spot regime is increasing (decreasing) when financial distress are zero
(positive). The spot regime dominates if E (ΠAS) > ΠALT , and the long term contract regime dominates if
otherwise.
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Figure 2.2: Oligopoly Equilibrium with Zero Financial Distress Costs
Expected profit of each buyer under the spot regime, E (piAS), and under the long term contract regime, E (piALT ),
as a function of the number of firms outsourcing to the spot market, if financial distress costs are zero, and assuming
that the outsourcing price provided by the supplier is the same as the expected spot price, pBLT = m. In equilibrium,
all firms outsource to the spot market as E (piAS) is always greater than E (piALT ).
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